Eric Redman v. Warden Lewisburg USP by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-4-2018 
Eric Redman v. Warden Lewisburg USP 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"Eric Redman v. Warden Lewisburg USP" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 262. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/262 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 
 
DLD-159 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-1194 
___________ 
 
ERIC REDMAN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN LEWISBURG USP 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-18-cv-00044) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 23, 2018 
 
Before:  JORDAN, SHWARTZ and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 4, 2018) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                                          
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se appellant Eric Redman, a federal prisoner currently confined at USP 
Lewisburg, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania dismissing his petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241.  We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and review its factual 
findings for clear error.  See Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (per curiam).  For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 In 2001, Redman pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia to offenses under both federal law and D.C. law.  He appealed, and the D.C. 
Circuit dismissed the appeal, concluding that Redman had waived the challenge he 
sought to raise.  See United States v. Redman, 331 F.3d 982, 988 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  In 
2016, Redman filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  D.D.C. Cr. A. No. 00-cr-0198.  
He alleged that the District Court had lacked jurisdiction over the offenses charged under 
the D.C. Code.  The District Court denied the motion, concluding that it was barred by 
AEDPA’s one-year limitations period.  Redman did not appeal.   
 Redman then filed the petition under § 2241 that is at issue in this appeal.  He 
reasserted the jurisdictional argument that he raised in his § 2255 motion and argued that 
he should be able to raise the claim under § 2241.  The District Court dismissed the 
petition, concluding that Redman’s claim could be raised only in a § 2255 motion.  
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Redman then filed a timely notice of appeal.  He has also asked for the appointment of 
counsel. 
 We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case.  “Motions pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge 
their convictions or sentences[.]”  Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 
2002).  As we have explained, “under the explicit terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, unless a 
§ 2255 motion would be ‘inadequate or ineffective,’ a habeas corpus petition under 
§ 2241 cannot be entertained by the court.”  Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538 (quoting § 2255(e)).  
“A § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective only where the petitioner demonstrates that 
some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a § 2255 proceeding from affording 
him a full hearing and adjudication of his wrongful detention claim.”  Id.  This exception 
is narrow and applies in only rare circumstances.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 
251-52 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 179-80 
(3d Cir. 2017). 
 Redman argues that this exception applies here.  He contends that AEDPA’s one-
year limitations period—which prevented the District Court for the District of Columbia 
from ruling on the merits of his claim—represents the type of “limitation of procedure” 
that makes § 2255 inadequate or ineffective.  This argument is foreclosed by our case 
law.  See Cradle, 290 F.3d at 539 (“Section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely 
because . . . the one-year statute of limitations has expired[.]”).   
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 Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  Redman’s 
motion for appointment of counsel is denied. 
